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This is not an article about cultural politics. It is, in the first instance, about a more extended concept of culture than the one we are more accustomed to. By 
implication, the concept of 'the political’ which goes with it 
is also more extended. These ‘extensions' — my main 
argument goes — are increasingly necessary in the 
consolidation, formation and re-formation of a popular 
theoretical, intellectual and cultural base for socialism in 
Australia. If the argument can be said to have one overriding 
aim then that is for us to develop a confidence and expertise 
in the procedures of ‘agenda-setting’ on social, economic 
and political issues rather than a reliance on the politics of 
the defensive knee-jerk.
What would it take to define, form or even reform the 
elements of a left political culture? We need to ask first, 
perhaps, what exactly is a political culture since theconcept, 
after a period of disuse, seems to be creeping back by stealth 
or by explicit intervention into the language of left debates. 
Secondly, we need to ask, does the left have one and what is 
it like? Thirdly, if we do have one, then what, with ‘renewal’ 
and ‘prospects’ in mind, would be the conditions for its 
reformation?
The Broad Left Conference had a session entitled 
‘Political Culture' which was actually about cultural 
politics, which is something different. If I explain, briefly, 
how they are different, then perhaps I can mount an 
argument about why I think that the concept political 
culture -  or at least the areas that it attempts to designate -  
might be important for debates about the future of socialism 
in Australia.
Cultural politics is committed to the politicisation of 
culture: it insists that existing forms of culture — film, the 
fine arts, television, literature, theatre — do not provide 
innocent forms of recreation and pleasure. Cultural forms 
are, however attenuated and mediated they might be, 
essentially ideological by nature. Representations of, 
variously, national history, women. Aborigines, human 
nature in cultural forms are seen as having distinctive 
ideological effects. The aim of a cultural politics is to 
intervene in these forms of representation, to refuse them, to 
provide alternative forms and images and ways of writing. 
Cultural politics interrupts the dominant ideology at those 
points — in cultural forms — where they appear to be most 
natural and spontaneous and therefore most effective as a
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sort of unconscious substratum of the dominant culture 
This is a necessary and strategic form of intervention but, for 
reasons that I will argue in more detail below, it is restricted 
in its aims and. indeed, pace the proponents of cultural 
revolution, only one very small part of what needs to be a 
much larger and more sophisticated project. Cultural 
politics, on the whole, tends to work on a fairly restricted 
definition of culture; that of, as Raymond Williams 
describes it. ‘the works and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic activity’.1 Turn to the reviews pages of 
Tribune and you will see what 1 mean: books, fringe theatre, 
radical film. Rarely is there anything on, for example, sport, 
popular television or mainstream entertainment film. OK, 
so we recognise that we live in a dominant culture and that it 
is important to bring alternative forms to people's attention 
but the danger is that in carving out that worthy 
oppositional niche we might also be confining ourselves to 
it, that the ‘fringe’ might stay precisely that. Cultural 
politics, as currently practised, is always in danger of 
becoming a rather sterile avant-guardism or at best a politics 
of pure interruption. More of this argument later.
Cultural politics, as currently practised, is always 
in danger of becoming a rather sterile avant- 
guardism
Let me explore now the concept of ‘political culture 
and suggest why, in the face of cultural politics it might turn 
out to be a more useful concept. Firstly, the term culture 
refers here not to works and practices in any ‘artistic’ sense, 
but rather to a more ‘anthropological’ sense of the term as 
the distinctive forms, practices and techniques of, broadly, a 
’way of life’. That is, 1 would suggest, more appropriate for 
our purposes despite its rather amorphous nature. It has at 
least the redeeming feature of being broader in its 
application and not something which is only talked about in 
the reviews pages ol newspapers.
But there is a problem with the history of the concept of 
political culture which, as Tim Rowse clearly demonstrated 
a few years back,* has a dubious heritage in so far as it 
emerged from a combination of behaviourist theory and 
sociology as a way of explaining, in post-war social science 
and political theory, the essential pragmatism of Australian 
political attitudes. It was a term deployed by political 
theorists and taken up by politicians to both theorise and. of 
course, consolidate in a national mentality, the essential and 
immutable elements of consensus in Australian society. It 
could be wheeled on to explain the nature of voting patterns, 
of political parties, the arbitration system and much more. 
In contemporary mainstream political science, the concept 
is still used to explain, for example, the ‘countrymindedness’ 
of Queensland voters or their predisposition to 
authoritarian forms of government.3 It was and is a term 
which ignores a great deal, not least explicit areas of conflict 
and contestation over class, race or gender which, being on 
the margins as the political theorists thought, really did not 
significantly  affect the na tu re  of the essential 
predispositions’, the mental attitudes, the apparently 
permanent psychological orientations ol the Australian
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people. To frame a consensus, as we well know from more 
recent uses of the term, you have to exclude or marginalise 
more troubling conflicts from the picture.
Given alt these problems associated with the concept 
political culture, why bother with it at all? Why is the term 
enjoying something of a resurgence and why am I prepared 
to argue that it might have some use in debates on the future 
of socialism. My answers to these questions are tentative but 
nonetheless insistent. They are both theoretical and more 
immediately political. Let me take the political point first.
The emergence of an increasingly well-organised and 
persuasive New Right committed to reforming ‘attitudes', 
winning ‘hearts and minds' and setting the agenda for new 
forms o f ‘common sense' by engaging in controversies over 
the family, education, morality, the nature of economic 
organisation and its concomitant field o f ‘rights’and ‘duties’ 
seems to me to indicate something of an assault not sim ply at 
the level of political theory or economic rationalism but also 
and, perhaps, most doggedly, at the level of popular opinion 
and beliefs. OK, you might say, we can recognise this, but 
what does it Have to do with the notion of political culture?
To answer this, it might be useful to consider one 
definition of the concept which focusses not so much on the 
way it is deployed as an instrument of consensus politics as 
on what its basic analytical purpose is:
the subjective perception o f  history and politics, the fundamental 
beliefs and values, the fo c i o f  identification and loyally, and the 
political knowledge and expectations which are the product o f  
specific historical experience4
Now, it might be objected that this is what marxists have 
always called ideology. Fair enough, but the problem with 
the concept of ideology is the theoretical baggage it carries
Popular beliefs can be dismissed as ideology, as a 
sort of veil pulled over the eyes of the people ... to 
keep them dumb or keep them amused
with it from the nineteenth century. It brings with it a sense 
of falseness, of illusion, of not seeing the real conditions. 
Popular beliefs can be dismissed as ideology, as a sort of veil 
pulled over the eyes of the people by the dominant class 
either to Keep them dumb or keep them amused. Not 
surprisingly, when you begin to speak of ideology as a form 
of political persuasion, people are either offended or bored. 
This is partly because we tend to think of ideologies as 
purely forms of belief at the level of ideas, in the head and 
not as deeply sedimented, 'practical' forms of common 
sense, as what Gramsci called ‘practical ideologies' which 
‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which 
people move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle, etc.5 This is, I think, a more useful definition of 
ideology (retaining theterm itself fora moment); it insists on 
its practical, rooted, organisational capacities, on its ability 
to be formative and active rather than purely reflective. It 
insists also on its popular nature, its depth and resilience. 
This is a terrain which the New Right takes seriously. In 
another but not unrelated context, Stuart Hall has argued, 
via Gramsci, that
What is at issue here is the transformation o f  those 'practical 
ideologies' which make the conditions o f  life intelligible ... and 
which exercise a practical and material force by organising the it 
actions. What is at issue is the production ... o f  new kinds oj 
'common sense'.6
Read Katharine West closely and you will see that she is not 
writing as a Professor of Political Science but, rather, as a 
‘professor’ of a form of political anthropology. She is I 
concerned, perhaps more persuasively than any other 
exponent of the New Right in Australia, precisely with those 
aspects of political culture which would fall under the 
heading of subjective perceptions, fundamental beliefs, toci 
ol identification and loyalty and common sense, much more 
than she is with taking on heropponents ‘intellectually’. She 
is able, in her own terms, and by recognising both the 
breadth of the terrain which the notion of political culture 
designates, and the complexity of 'subjective' factors 
involved, to extend her political mode of address much 
beyond the spheres of economic and political theory. Thai, 
if you like, is the immediate political reason for my 
argument. But an engagement with the notion of political 
culture has, I would argue, a more long-term purchase in 
prospects for renewal and in our attention to putting our 
own political culture in order
While the left has spent nearly twenty years 
wondering what ‘the personal is political'actually 
means ... the New Right have been getting on with 
doing it
In different terms to those envisaged by the first users ol 
the concept of political culture there is a growing 
recognition that what, for want of a better world, we can caii 
the ‘subjective’ side of politics — areas of choice, personal 
dispositions and preferences, gender and sexuality concerns 
over individual privacy and legal protection of the person 
separate and quite distinct spheres of value are becoming
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increasingly important. While the left has spent nearly 
twenty years wondering what ‘the personal is political’ 
actually means, or interpreting it in unduly narrow and 
uniform ways, the more perceptive proponents of the New 
Right have been getting on with doing it — with 
personalising the political and politicising the personal. 
Questions of ‘lifestyle’, getting government 'off our backs’, 
fending for yourself. Right to Life, and so on; these are the 
markers of a personalist politics which confronts head on 
the area of subjectivity, of the ethical and moral spheres 
about which the left has had comparatively little to say. 
Occupying our little oppositional or ‘alternative* niche, we 
have tended to operate on the ‘Archimedes principle’ of 
politics; find a point outside the world with a sufficient lever 
and a correctly placed fulcrum and you can move that 
world. The trouble is, of course, that the left, like 
Archimedes, would be all alone out there.
This, of course, is something of a caricature but, like all 
caricatures, it attempts to highlight a traif, a tendency. There 
are notable exceptions to the Archimedes Principle in, for 
example, the women’s movement, which has engaged 
directly not only in critique of existing attitudes — that by 
itself would be no better than what I have been criticising in 
the left as a whole — but also in the transformation of 
elementsof the political culture — forms of identification, 
loyalties, subjective perceptions and so on. The 
transformation of a cultural critique into forms of political 
action and the formation of specific policies and legislative 
imperatives; this is the crucial move from a cultural politics 
to a political culture. There is a difference however: the 
women's movement can identify its main and primary 
constituency — women. The left, the socialist movement.
has more of a problem here. What exactly is its 
constituency? The working class? Working people? Workers 
by hand and by brain? Oppressed people? All of these? If the 
latter is the case, as it probably is since it comprises most of 
the population, then how do we address our constituency?
Part of the answer to this lies in taking seriously areas of 
identification, attitude and belief and to acknowledge that 
they have more than illusory or ‘ideological’ forms of 
existence: that they have popular forms of existence. The 
recognition of ‘the popular’ and a systematic engagement 
with its resilient texture has important implications botrh 
with its resilient texture has important implications both for 
the ways in which we direct our analysis of existing 
conditions and for the ways in which we might want to shape 
a more vigorous, expert and confident left political culture.7
Class ... is proving increasingly difficult to define 
... especially when the adjectives ‘working’, 
‘middle’ or ‘ruling are added to it
The left has historically viewed the ‘popular’ with stern 
suspicion. With faultless dialectical logic, marxists have 
insistently demonstrated that the popular, the people, 
populism are at best illusory forms concealing the realities of 
class and, at worst, the watchwords of fascism and reaction. 
Socialists are, after all, concerned with clas&es — easily 
definable as we used to think — and not with this nebulous 
entity ‘the people’. In fact, the reverse now operates. Other 
political forces are able to make great play of ‘the people’ 
because, although it is difficult to get hold of in an intuitive 
sort of way - -  you and I are people after all. Class, on the
Sport and its fascination are rarely taken seriously by the left.
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other nand, is proving increasingly ditiicult to define even by 
the most skilled practitioners, especially when the adjectives 
‘working’, ‘middle’ or ‘ruling’ are added to it. Class has not 
of course, disappeared; it's more a question of our resources 
and political imagery being no longer adequate to defining 
its place in political processes. Certainly, when the definition 
of the primary components of what you had taken to be your 
political constituency is at stake, then you are in a bit of 
trouble. One thing is sure here, though: we can no longer rely 
on the sort of ecclesiastical condescension with which we hae 
customarily explained to ‘thepeople’that it’s really all about 
class.
Perhaps the logic is not so rigorous any more but it is 
difficult to note a certain legacy ol left suspicion of ‘the 
popular’ in our refusal to engage with what is demonstrably 
popular in Australian culture? If the only occasion for 
saying something about to use the insistent example 
again — sport — is when it is primarily defined in the 
political arena of, say, tours of South Africa or the financing 
of the Sydney Swans by big business. If. in other words, 
sport is reduced to a mere side effect of central political and 
economic issues, and if it is allowed no realm of sufficiency, 
no claim to pleasure by itself, is it any wonder that we tail to 
engage with a dominant element of the national culture? 
With a few exceptions, notably — and ironically — in 
journals directed at mainly academic audiences, serious 
analysis of sport, its effects on our ‘dispositions’ not least 
the disposition to go to a football or netball match rather 
than attend another boring meeting — is significantly absent 
from, and radically impoverishes, current left political 
culture. There is an awful lot, on the ‘subjective’ side of 
politics, that can be said about sport — on codes of 
masculinity, for example, or on its effects on national, 
regional and class and gender identifications or on ‘lifestyle’ 
and the star system a la Gerg Matthews, or on its effects as a 
medium for the ‘New Nationalism’.
The same goes for popular television and film, ignored by 
the left or, at best, construed as a contemporary opiate of the 
masses. All we can do is recommend ‘worthy’ programs on 
the ABC or SBS, or an intensely meaningful and relevant
Carnival at the Sydney Palm Sunday Rallv, 1986.
film at the local art house cinema, pretty much in the manner 
of a wett-meaning parson. We can say nothing about the 
mass audiences for Dallas, the features of indigenous 
programs like Neighbours, A Country Practice, Sorts and 
Daughters, Prisoner. And what about Crocodile Dundee? 
We may not like them or, simply by virtue of attending too 
many meetings, be ignorant of them and other spheres of 
popular pleasure and leisure activities, but let us be very sure 
that the way in which they handle issues such as gender 
relationships, the national character, community politics, 
ethical values, representations o f ‘ordinary folk’and so on is 
much more effective on a daily and weekly basis tnan a 
thousand mass meetings. You don't need to subscribe toany ' 
crude theories of the effects of television on behaviour to 
accept this proposition; the simple fact is that, whatever 
their effects, important elements of political cultures are 
regularly deployed and circulated in these programs; they 1 
are talked about and ‘put on the agenda’ in ways the left 
knows and says little about. Crucially, these areas pose the 
central question of the range of complex and effective social j 
identities suggested by the concept of political culture.
On the basis of these two examples, I would suggest I 
that our current constituency, or at least our ability to 
address a constituency, is impoverished. It is probably ’ 
vacuous to say that our constituency is ‘the people’ bu' we 
should at least initiate and maintain a sustained engagement I 
with ‘the popular’. There is a large and fatal discrepancy 
between the resilient and resourceful fabric of the dominant 
culture and the means we have at our disposal for engaging 
with it. In the absence of such forms of address and 
engagement is it any wonder that both the image and the 
practices of the left are perceived and experiences as severely 
constrained ones? Agendas, meetings, slogans, conspiracies 
and a lot of unwelcome‘soap box’noise operating on a logic 
of illusions and trying lo persuade the people where they 
have got it wrong and what they ought to be doing in the 
evenings or on a Saturday afternoon. Again, I apologise, a 
caricature but certainly, as another session at the Broad Left 
Conference on ‘The Plealsure Principle in Politics’ pointed 
out amid the smirks o f ‘serious socialists’, we (who live in the 
realm of urgent necessity) do have a problem wit hour social 
imagery and our political symbolism.
Putting aside the smirks for a moment, though, let me 
suggest that this ‘pleasure principle’ or whatever you want 
to call it is crucially related to the questions that I have raised 
above concerning our engagement with the forms of populai 
culture. 1 can best do this by illustrating an experience from 
the UK in 1977. That year was, as you may remember, the 
year of the Queen's Jubilee. The most memorable image that 
I have of this was the glum faces of the left as they witnessed 
what they thought was their natural political constituency in 
working class communities organising street parties ana 
festivals and festooning the streets and neighbourhoods 
with bunting. The care-worn left stood back, looked of 
disapprovingly and mumbled things like ‘stuff the Jubilee’ 
or ‘down with the monarchy’. For ‘serious socialists’ there 
could only be one pessimistic meaning to this; the masses 
were in thrall to a monolithic royalist ideology. Bui, as Latin 
American friends more familiar with the nature of popular 
festivals pointed out to me at the time, the meanings of these 
celebrations were not exhausted by the fact that their
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explicit object was the celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the 
Queen and its official train of reactionary national 
pageantry. Celebrations, festivals — in the manner of the 
Italian Communist Party's national and regional Feste 
dell'Unita — have a surplus of meaning beyond their 
immediate objects. They are occasions for establishing, 
remiorcing, and furthering community values, values of 
solidarity and of locality and, crucially, of a range of social 
identities. Neighbourhoods which had forgotten that they 
| were neighbourhoods were re-established more in spite of 
than because of the explicit and official intentions of the 
celebrations. At a broader level it celebrated certain features 
of both local and national membership, kinship and 
citizenship which are not at all defined purely by the 
existence of a monarchy. The British Communist Party at 
the time took advantage of this ‘surplus’ of meanings and 
organised a ‘People’s Jubilee’which turned out, in fact, to be 
the largest social gathering of the British left since the war. A 
momentary indication, perhaps, that in engaging with ‘the 
popular’ we will need to get our hands ‘dirty’ by dealing with 
poDular pleasures but might come out looking brighter and 
less jaded than we do now.
Over the next couple of years we are going to be 
confronted with this problem on a grand scale in Australia 
because of the advent, in 1988, of the Bicentenary 
celebrations. We have just witnessed how, in the USA, a 
potent and monumental symbol such as ‘Liberty’ is all too 
easily appropriated to a Reaganesque design. What are we 
going to do about our own forthcoming national 
celebrations? How are we to participate in the shaping of a 
national identity at the level of popular symbols and 
sentiments. Are we to leave this to the corporate 
imagination of the Quiet Achiever? Are we to celebrate a 
tradition of unity or diversity? How will the national 
image be shaped ethnically — a celebration of costumes and 
and ‘traditions’ in a sort of vast national museum? 
Selfcongratulation or critical scrutiny? Clearly, the role of 
the Aboriginal peoples will be crucial in this if they decide to 
participate but in addition to this we cannot afford to stand 
on the sidelines and watch the composite national image 
being put together as if it had nothing to do with us, as if it 
was just another show for the dominant culture, and as if, 
finally, we were outside of that dominant culture. As if 
dominance were purely an issue of imposition "from above’ 
and not also a signal of some form of acceptance ‘from 
below’, however negotiated and attenuated that acceptance 
might be.
On this last point — the dominant culture — we need, 
as I have suggested above in relation to sport and the media, 
to develop much more sophisticated lines of engagement 
and argument. The notion of a ‘dominant culture’ is itself, 
perhaps, a useful abstraction but one which it is quite 
difficult to identify, rather like the ‘dominant ideology’. 1 am 
not arguing that there is no such thing as dominance; it is 
just that when the adjective is applied to complex area > like 
culture and ideology, it tends to convert them into 
monoliths and, at the same time, to suggest that we who can 
identify it are somehow outside of it, in a purely critical 
relationship of opposition. Archimedes again. So how 
should we approach or, indeed, attempt to identify what we 
customarily refer to as the dominant culture?
The normal way of doing this is to identify its 
attributes. Let's take a broad selection and say that it is 
cap ita lis t ,  bourgeois ,  ind ivdualis t ic ,  com petitive, 
patriarchal, racist, and neo-colonial. All of these are no 
doubt accurate in their own ways and in their specific fields 
of reference. The problem is, however, that they are 
ultimately only describing components of the dominant 
culture. Except by some notion of imposition by the 
dominant classes, this form of argument says nothing much 
about how this combination of attributes became dominant. 
This part of the argument is left to the assumption that, 
under capitalism, there is a certain logic which dictates that 
given ideas will come to dominate. This, of course, is not 
unlike that other, earlier, conception of political culture 
which identifies the essential attributes of Australian society 
in order to organise them into a monolith called consensus.
Central to the formation of a left political culture 
would be the noise of the frantic sharpening of our 
analysis
But whether the monolith is called consensus or class 
struggle, it remains, nonetheless, a monolith. In these forms 
of analvsis, the question remains as to how  particular 
‘subjective perceptions’ became established in the ways they 
did, and how  these perceptions played an important role in 
sedimenting forms of social identity, beliefs, loyalties and 
political knowledges. In the face of this formidably complex 
array of questions we have been accustomed to using rather 
blunt and heavy forms of analysis. Central to the formation 
of a left political culture would be the noise of the frantic 
sharpening of our analyses.
If we are to retain some usefulness from the concept of 
political culture, some emphasis on how forms of social 
identity are not reducible to simple origins in class, 
consensus or capitalism, then there isa strong argument for 
pluralising the concept, in speaking of a range of political 
cultures, elements of which may be in conflict and 
contestation within the national culture. Certainly, there are 
preferred and, if you like, dominant arrangements within
Popular movies are generally construed as contemporary 
opiates of the masses: Star Wars.
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that culture, preferred and dominant forms of identification 
which are grounded firmly within the popular imagination, 
but the important thing is that we recognise that this is a 
complex and plural form of arrangement in the light of 
which a not<on like th e ‘dominant culture’might seem a little 
inadequate. The women’s movement has repeatedly 
emphasised that gendered forms of subordination cannot be 
explained away by the existence of capitalism and nor, 
consequently, do they automatically disappear when 
capitalism does. The same is certainly true of racism and the 
persistent theme of individualism against which, we have to 
acknowledge, the counter position of the experience of 
forms of collectivism has not been resoundingly successful. 
Australia is a composite of political cultures, a field of 
contesting positions and identities in which some become 
dominant, others subordinate or marginalised. That is not a 
once and for all situation describing the baselines of 
'national character’ or the ‘class basis'; it i s , precisely, a field 
of forces in which it is possible to intervene provided that we 
have adequate means for intervention.
The concomitant to this argument about making our 
arguments, forms of analysis and subsequent procedures of 
policy formation more sophisticated is to acknowledge an 
important point made recently by Michael Rustin in his 
argument for forms of ‘complex equality':
The more prosperous and seemingly pluralistic society has become 
in its life-styles, the more difficult it has been fo r  socialists to defend  
egalitarian ideals against the imputation that they would enforce 
an unwanted uniformity1
More directly relation to questions of economic planning, 
Rustin goes on to argue that
Visions which conceive the abolition o f  a single dominant fo rm  o f  
inequality — such as the replacement o f  the market by central 
economic planning  — are often blind to the characteristic 
inequalities o f  the alternative form . Even arguments fo r  more 
extensive fo rm s o f  participatory democracy — fo r  the 
transparency o f  social decision making, as it is sometimes called— 
often take a simplistic view o f  what could possible be 'transparent'. 
A n y rrodem  society has to have innumerable specialisms, many 
centres o f  value and decision, and therefore many competing 
interests, and socialist politics m ust now take account o f  these 
fa c ts  *
Rustin is confronting here quite simply the whole nature of a 
socialist vision, the whole basis, if you like, of a left political 
culture. It is difficult to deny the power of this argument 
even though it entails the unloading of a good deal of 
ideological and political baggage. The commitment to a 
pluralist socialism, the recognition of a diversity of interests 
and the concomitant requirement of the development of 
levels of sophistication in analysis, range of engagements 
and policy formation are all elements which, in our current 
left political culture, are floating around in rather disjointed 
ways, some partial, some more fully developed. If we could 
find ways of strategically developing and uniting these 
expertises, commitments and more localised skills in a 
common program of socialist renewal, then we would be 
talking about a vigorous and effective left political culture. 
This would entail, in turn, the formation of a diversified 
theoretical and intellectual base for socialism in Australia;
intellectual, that is, not in terms of the powers of ‘pure 
thought’ but at the level of organisation, policy formation 
and decision making procedures in all fields.
It would requirealso the unloading of a good deal of the 
baggage o f ‘class nostalgia'and frequently pervasive fomu 
o f ‘workerism*. It would certainly mean sharpening up some 
of our present toots of analysis but also, and perhaps more 
important, the development of new forms to match the 
growing technical and ideological sophistication of forces 
currently dominant or emergent.
Our range of knowledge needs to be more specific; we 
need to know at least as much about the workings of local 
government as we do about the global economic crisis and 
international politics (a common problem of the left, this) 1 
We need, developing these resources, to get far away from 
the mentality of the ‘ginger group’; to know more about the
We need ‘technicians’ rather than prophets
complex features of specific and regional political cultures, 
to know why, for example, Joh Bjelke-Petersen is popular 
without recourse to demeaning platitudes about ‘The Deep 
North’ and we need to engage, much more insistently and 
productively, with the major themes of popular and national 
culture with forms of collective memory and self-definition 
without reducing them to excrescences of a capitalist 
controlled media.
And we need, finally, not so much a Vision’ of an 
alternative society as a set of working principles for iht 
qualitative transformation of current forms of social and 
economic organisation. We need 'technicians' rather than 
prophets.
This, of course, is an elaborate range of demands but no 
apologies should need to be made for it.
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